This book provides the first comprehensive and critical examination of Mäki's realist philosophy of economics.

Derivational robustness may increase the degree to which various pieces of evidence indirectly confirm a robust result. There are two ways in which this increase may come about. First, if one can show that a result is robust, and that the various individual models used to derive it also have other confirmed results, these other results may indirectly confirm the robust result. Confirmation derives from the fact that data not known to bear on a result are shown to be relevant (...) when it is shown to be robust. Second, robustness may increase the degree to which the robust result is indirectly confirmed if it increases the weight with which existing evidence indirectly confirms it. This may happen when it strengthens the connection between the core and the robust result by showing that auxiliaries are not responsible for the result. (shrink)

The most common argument against the use of rational choice models outside economics is that they make unrealistic assumptions about individual behavior. We argue that whether the falsity of assumptions matters in a given model depends on which factors are explanatorily relevant. Since the explanatory factors may vary from application to application, effective criticism of economic model building should be based on model-specific arguments showing how the result really depends on the false assumptions. However, some modeling results in imperialistic applications (...) are relatively robust with respect to unrealistic assumptions. Key Words: unrealistic assumptions • economics imperialism • rational choice • as if • robustness. (shrink)

This paper provides a conceptual framework that allows for distinguishing between different kinds of generalisation and applicability. It is argued that generalising models may bring epistemic benefits. They do so if they show that restrictive and unrealistic assumptions do not threaten the credibility of results derived from models. There are two different notions of applicability, generic and specific, which give rise to three different kinds of generalizations. Only generalising a result brings epistemic benefits concerning the truth of model components or (...) results. Abstracting the model and applying the model into new systems are not intrinsically epistemically beneficial in this way. The Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition is used as an illustration. (shrink)

Robustness may increase the degree to which the robust result is indirectly confirmed if it is shown to depend on confirmed rather than disconfirmed assumptions. Although increasing the weight with which existing evidence indirectly confirms it in such a case, robustness may also be irrelevant for confirmation, or may even disconfirm. Whether or not it confirms depends on the available data and on what other results have already been established.

Like other mathematically intensive sciences, economics is becoming increasingly computerized. Despite the extent of the computation, however, there is very little true simulation. Simple computation is a form of theory articulation, whereas true simulation is analogous to an experimental procedure. Successful computation is faithful to an underlying mathematical model, whereas successful simulation directly mimics a process or a system. The computer is seen as a legitimate tool in economics only when traditional analytical solutions cannot be derived, i.e., only as a (...) purely computational aid. We argue that true simulation is seldom practiced because it does not fit the conception of understanding inherent in mainstream economics. According to this conception, understanding is constituted by analytical derivation from a set of fundamental economic axioms. We articulate this conception using the concept of economists' perfect model. Since the deductive links between the assumptions and the consequences are not transparent in ‘bottom‐up’ generative microsimulations, microsimulations cannot correspond to the perfect model and economists do not therefore consider them viable candidates for generating theories that enhance economic understanding. (shrink)

This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas by comparing the average utilities obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. The average utility obtained in simulations is higher with expected utility maximising behaviour than with sincere voting behaviour under a broad range of assumptions. Strategic voting increases welfare particularly if the distribution of preference intensities correlates with voter types.

It is argued in this paper that amalgamating confirmation from various sources is relevantly different from social-choice contexts, and that proving an impossibility theorem for aggregating confirmation measures directs attention to irrelevant issues.

This paper provides the first systematic epistemological account of simulated data in empirical science. We focus on the epistemic issues modelers face when they generate simulated data to solve problems with empirical datasets, research tools, or experiments. We argue that for simulated data to count as epistemically reliable, a simulation model does not have to mimic its target. Instead, some models take empirical data as a target, and simulated data may successfully mimic such a target even if the model does (...) not. We show how to distinguish between simulated and empirical data, and we also offer a definition of simulation that can accommodate Monte Carlo models. We shed light on the epistemology of simulated data by providing a taxonomy of four different mimicking relations that differ concerning the nature of the relation or relata. We illustrate mimicking relations with examples from different sciences. Our main claim is that the epistemic evaluation of simulated data should start with recognizing the diversity of mimicking relations rather than presuming that only one relation existed. (shrink)

Kirjasymposio Eerik Lagerspetzin Social Choice and Democratic Values – kirjasta. Kenneth Arrowia seuraten Lagerspetz pitää sosiaalisen valinnan teorian suurimpana vahvuutena sitä, että sen tuloksia voidaan käyttää monissa erilaisissa yhteyksissä. Minä taas pidän teorian suurimpana heikkoutena sen vaikeutta: tutkijat eivät ole päässeet yhteisymmärrykseen erityisesti ns. epärelevanttien vaihtoehtojen riippumattomuusehdon tulkinnasta ja muotoilusta. Lagerspetz hyväksyy kirjassaan nähdäkseni seuraavat väitteet: kaikki demokraattiset äänestyssäännöt rikkovat riippumattomuusehtoa, mutta että tuo ehto on silti normatiivisesti perusteltu. Arrow’n ehdot ovat intuitiivisesti ottaen hyväksyttävissä. Koska riippumattomuusehdon rikkoutumisesta seuraa strategista äänestämistä (...) ja strateginen äänestäminen on normatiivisesti katsottuna ei-toivottavaa tai jopa moraalisesti kyseenalaista, strategisen äänestämisen poissulkeminen olisi paras mahdollinen argumentti riippumattomuusehdon puolesta. Lisäksi säännöt jotka toteuttavat riippumattomuusehdon ovat immuuneja strategiselle käyttäytymiselle. Hyvin toimiva äänestyssääntö luo puhtaasti mekaanisen yhteyden yksilöiden mielipiteiden ja kollektiivisen valinnan välille. Tämän kirjoituksen ensisijainen tavoite on kumota jokainen edellisessä kappaleessa esitetty väite. (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical critique of social choice theory insofar as it deals with the normative evaluation of voting and voting rules. I will argue that the very method of evaluating voting rules in terms of whether they satisfy various conditions is deeply problematic because introducing strategic behaviour leads to a violation of any condition that makes a difference between voting rules. I also argue that it is legitimate to make interpersonal comparisons of utilities in voting theory. Combining a (...) realistic account of voters’ behaviour with a utilitarian evaluation of the outcomes then leads to the judgment that strategic voting is beneficial. If it is, then Arrow's theorem does not have far-reaching consequences for democracy because one of its conditions is not normatively acceptable. (shrink)

Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) has been under criticism for decades for not taking account of preference intensities. Computer-simulation results by Aki Lehtinen concerning strategic voting under various voting rules show that this intensity argument does not need to rest on mere intuition. Voters may express intensities by voting strategically, and that this has beneficial aggregate-level consequences: utilitarian efficiency is higher if voters engage in strategic behaviour than if they always vote sincerely. Strategic voting is thus unambiguously beneficial (...) under a utilitarian evaluation of outcomes. What has been considered the main argument for IIA turns out to be one against it. This paper assesses the implications of these results for interpretations of Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in a discussion on the methodological and philosophical arguments concerning preference intensities and IIA. (shrink)

A review of Donald Katzner's book on economic modelling is provided. In addition to characterising the book, I give critical comments on the distinction between primary and secondary assumptions.

Following an established tradition, the current special issue collects five articles that originate from papers presented at the IX Conference of the International Network for Economic Method. The conference took place in Helsinki on 1–3 September 2011 and was hosted by TINT (Trends and Tensions in Intellectual Integration), University of Helsinki. The conference was successful both in terms of the number of participants and the quality of the presentations. Although the sample of papers that made it to this special issue (...) is relatively small, we think that it is representative of some of the major contemporary currents in the wider field of the philosophy and methodology of economics. The papers examine both long-debated and more recent issues. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the philosophical accounts of generalisation in formal modelling by introducing a conceptual framework that allows for recognising generalisations that are epistemically beneficial in the sense of contributing to the truth of a model result or component. The framework is useful for modellers themselves because it is shown how to recognise different kinds of generalisation on the basis of changes in model descriptions. Since epistemically beneficial generalisations usually de-idealise the model, the paper proposes a reformulation of the (...) well-known distinction between abstraction and idealisation. A reformulated notion of abstraction is needed because the extant accounts yield wrong judgments when model-modifications introduce implicit assumptions. (shrink)

We claim that the process of theoretical model refinement in economics is best characterised as robustness analysis: the systematic examination of the robustness of modelling results with respect to particular modelling assumptions. We argue that this practise has epistemic value by extending William Wimsatt's account of robustness analysis as triangulation via independent means of determination. For economists robustness analysis is a crucial methodological strategy because their models are often based on idealisations and abstractions, and it is usually difficult to tell (...) which idealisations are truly harmful. (shrink)

Robert Sugden argues that robustness analysis cannot play an epistemic role in grounding model-world relationships because the procedure is only a matter of comparing models with each other. We posit that this argument is based on a view of models as being surrogate systems in too literal a sense. In contrast, the epistemic importance of robustness analysis is easy to explicate if modelling is viewed as extended cognition, as inference from assumptions to conclusions. Robustness analysis is about assessing the reliability (...) of our extended inferences, and when our confidence in these inferences changes, so does our confidence in the results. Furthermore, we argue that Sugden’s inductive account relies tacitly on robustness considerations. (shrink)

Odenbaugh and Alexandrova provide a challenging critique of the epistemic benefits of robustness analysis, singling out for particular criticism the account we articulated in Kuorikoski et al.. Odenbaugh and Alexandrova offer two arguments against the confirmatory value of robustness analysis: robust theorems cannot specify causal mechanisms and models are rarely independent in the way required by robustness analysis. We address Odenbaugh and Alexandrova’s criticisms in order to clarify some of our original arguments and to shed further light on the properties (...) of robustness analysis and its epistemic rationale. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWe investigate the applicability of Rodrik’s accounts of model selection and horizontal progress to macroeconomic DSGE modelling in both academic and policy-oriented modelling contexts. We argue that the key step of identifying critical assumptions is complicated by the interconnectedness of the common structural core of DSGE models and by the ad hoc modifications introduced to model various rigidities and other market imperfections. We then outline alternative ways in which macroeconomic modelling could become more horizontally progressive.

Political science and economic science . . . make use of the same language, the same mode of abstraction, the same instruments of thought and the same method of reasoning. (Black 1998, 354) Proponents as well as opponents of economics imperialism agree that imperialism is a matter of unification; providing a unified framework for social scientific analysis. Uskali Mäki distinguishes between derivational and ontological unification and argues that the latter should serve as a constraint for the former. We explore whether, (...) in the case of rational-choice political science, self-interested behavior can be seen as a common causal element and solution concepts as the common derivational element, and whether the former constraints the use of the latter. We find that this is not the case. Instead, what is common to economics and rational-choice political science is a set of research heuristics and a focus on institutions with similar structures and forms of organization. (shrink)

All economic models involve abstractions and idealisations. Economic theory itself does not tell which idealizations are truly fatal or harmful for the result and which are not. This is why much of what is seen as theoretical contribution in economics is constituted by deriving familiar results from different modelling assumptions. If a modelling result is robust with respect to particular modelling assumptions, the empirical falsity of these particular assumptions does not provide grounds for criticizing the result. In this paper we (...) demonstrate how derivational robustness analysis does carry epistemic weight and answer criticism concerning its non-empirical nature and the problematic form of the required independence of the ways of derivation. The epistemic rationale and importance of robustness analysis also challenge some common conceptions of the role of theory in economics. (shrink)

Ajatuksen toimitus on ystävällisesti suonut minulle tilaisuuden vastata Aki Lehtisen ja Kaisa Herneen kirjoituksiin. Vaikka Lehtinen on radikaalimpi sosiaalisen valinnan teorian kriitikko kuin minä, hän on joiltakin osin sitoutunut teorian perusolettamuksiin minua tiukemmin. Käsittelen vastauksessani kolmea näistä. Lisäksi tuon esiin, miksi riippumattomuussääntöä koskevat jatkuvat erimielisyydet eivät nähdäkseni ole vakavin heikkous sosiaalisen valinnan teoriassa; kiistanalaisin peruskäsite on pikemminkin sosiaalisen preferenssi- eli paremmuusjärjestyksen käsite. Kommentoin myös lyhyesti Lehtisen tulkintaa utiliteettien maksimoimisesta. Kaisa Herne tarkastelee omassa esityksessään äänestyssääntöjen valintaa. John Lockea seuraten, päätöksentekijöiden (...) velvollisuus on valita oikeudenmukaisin mahdollinen vaalijärjestelmä. Mahdollisia keskenään yhteensopimattomia oikeudenmukaisuuskriteerejä on kuitenkin hyvin paljon. Herneen käsittelemä ajatus tietämättömyyden verhon takana tehtävästä valinnasta oikeudenmukaisuuden takaajana on modernin yhteiskuntafilosofian keskeisiä oivalluksia. Hänen selostamansa päätöksentekokokeet osoittavat, että tietämättömyyden verhoa ei tarvitse mieltää vain ajatukselliseksi apuvälineeksi. Vaikka empiiriset deliberaatiokokeet ovat tietyllä tavalla vakuuttavampia kuin pelkät ajatuskokeet, ne nähdäkseni ovat alttiita osin samantyyppisille metodologisille ongelmille, joita lyhyesti esittelen vastauksessani. (shrink)

Conscientious objection to participating in induced abortion is not present in the Finnish health care system or legislation unlike in many other European countries.

The realities of human agency and decision making pose serious challenges for research ethics. This article explores six major challenges that require more attention in the ethics education of students and scientists and in the research on ethical conduct in science. The first of them is the routinization of action, which makes the detection of ethical issues difficult. The social governance of action creates ethical problems related to power. The heuristic nature of human decision making implies the risk of ethical (...) bias. The moral disengagement mechanisms represent a human tendency to evade personal responsibility. The greatest challenge of all might be the situational variation in people’s ethical behaviour. Even minor situational factors have a surprisingly strong influence on our actions. Furthermore, finally, the nature of ethics itself also causes problems: instead of clear answers, we receive a multitude of theories and intuitions that may sometimes be contradictory. All these features of action and ethics represent significant risks for ethical conduct in science. I claim that they have to be managed within the everyday practices of science and addressed explicitly in research ethics education. I analyse them and suggest some ways in which their risks can be alleviated. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism states that evolution cannot produce warranted beliefs. In contrast, according to Plantinga, Christian theism provides properly functioning cognitive faculties in an appropriate cognitive environment, in accordance with a design plan aimed at producing true beliefs. But does theism fulfill criteria I–III? Judging from the Bible, God employs deceit in his relations with humanity, rendering our cognitive functions unreliable. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that God's purpose would be to produce true beliefs in (...) humans. Finally, from the theistic/religious perspective, it is impossible to tell whether observations have natural or supernatural causes, which undermines an appropriate cognitive environment. Reliable identification of deceit or miracles could alleviate these problems, but the theistic community has failed to resolve this issue. Dismissal of parts of the Bible, or attempts to find alternative interpretations, would collapse into skepticism or deism. Thus, Plantinga's problem of epistemic warrant backfires on theism. (shrink)

Business and Society Review, Volume 127, Issue S1, Page 223-251, Spring 2022.

The aim of this article was to illuminate the issue of basic research in nursing and to problematize its relevance for our discipline. First, we asked leading nursing scholars in the Nordic countries to share their views on basic research in nursing. Thereafter, the ideas, views and suggestions of the scholars were amalgamated with insights from the literature and from the discussions in our project team. Our two guiding questions were: What role can basic research be assigned? Which, if any, (...) forms of basic research can be identified? We found that basic nursing research may be seen as a necessary basis for applied research, as a contribution to applied research, or that the whole issue is seen as a pseudo-issue. We further found that basic nursing research can be seen as either contextual or general as well as either intradisciplinary or multidisciplinary in form. We conclude by the following three succinct remarks or assertions: that basic nursing research is not to be equated with biomedical conceptions of basic research; that basic nursing research may take place on several theoretical levels; and finally, that an indiscriminate dismissal of basic research in nursing may affect the cognitive autonomy of our discipline. (shrink)

This article examines the belief among the cultural elites that ‘people’ should be protected from dangerous knowledge, ‘dangerous’ in the sense that there are factual statements which may have negative moral and political consequences to society. Such a belief in the negative consequences of dangerous – that is, politically suspicious – knowledge represents an intellectual tradition that goes back to Plato and his famous state‐utopian work Republic. This article analyses moral interpretations of statements regarding matters of fact (so‐called moral reading), (...) and draws conclusions about the reasons why knowledge can be considered dangerous to ‘the people’ or to some specific groups in the population, such as children, mothers, students, the sick and dying and the working class. The so‐called sociobiology debate, a controversy that started with the publication of the zoologist E.O. Wilson’s Sociobiology in 1975, is discussed in this article as a ‘case study’ of dangerous knowledge. (shrink)

This paper focuses on a topical issue - the idea of ‘justice in education’ – developed by Krassimir Stojanov, among other recent educational justice theorists. Justice in education has to ask ‘educational questions about education’, which means that educational justice theory should be capable of dealing with educational practices, and constellations that are asymmetrical interaction orders. This requires, from the perspective of a child, criteria to distinguish between justified and unjustified educative demands towards responsibility and autonomy. This paper analyses forms (...) of recognition as a legitimate summons that enables the individual’s autonomy. It also analyses the illegitimate demands that emerge from Stojanov’s innovative idea to combine the forms of misrecognition with the concepts of epistemic injustice. The second chapter of this paper introduces the challenges related to the recognitive justice as justice in education. The examination of Dietrich Benner’s recent critique of recognition theory illuminates these challenges in two ways: first, it is shown that there can be something negatively experienced, but the result of productive disruptions that the educator need to produce, which are out of the scope of recognition theory. Second, the recognitive justice paradigm ignores elementary pedagogical conditions and requirements, ‘the pedagogical knowledge’ and its methods, and is therefore unable to fully grasp the legitimate educational authority. This paper concludes with a synthesis that finds the crucial elements from the recognition theory to justice in education and critically assessing Benner’s claims. Overall, the paper offers potential for further development in justice in education. (shrink)

A study of Modernist utopias of the mind. This book examines the psychodynamic writings of Otto Gross, C G Jung, Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm. It argues, utopianism became increasingly important to the fundamental ambitions of all four thinkers, and places the 'utopian impulse' with the historical context of the early twentieth century.

A study of Modernist utopias of the mind. This book examines the psychodynamic writings of Otto Gross, C G Jung, Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm. It argues, utopianism became increasingly important to the fundamental ambitions of all four thinkers, and places the 'utopian impulse' with the historical context of the early twentieth century.

ABSTRACT Right after the Finnish Civil War of 1918, the first treatises discussing the insurgents in crowd psychological terms were published. Between 1918 and the early 1920s, several Finnish authors used Gustave Le Bon's and other crowd psychologists’ ideas of suggestion, mental epidemics, and the dangers of socialism in their interpretations of the aborted revolution. The article argues that the use of crowd psychology in the years following the Finnish Civil War was an attempt to articulate in objective, scientific language (...) an emotional and moral reaction to the shock of seeing a nation violently divided and tearing itself apart. Intrinsic to Finnish interpretations of crowd psychology were the increasing antagonism between socialists and anti-socialists, the influence of Bolshevism on the worker's movement, the importance attributed to the ‘racial’ qualities of the people, and the impact of the Civil War on the educated classes – all issues that are easy to relate to wider European and global contexts. This article lends support to the thesis that crowd psychology was an influential intellectual construction that had great heuristic value among contemporaries from the late nineteenth century to World War II. (shrink)